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Abstract
The WTO has struggled with the treatment of nonmarket economies (NMEs). What was a nonissue in
the original GATT (because of the homogeneity of participants) became quite an issue with the
accession of formally centrally planned economies, which were not transformed to market economies,
at least not in the eyes of the incumbents. Contracting this issue has proved to be so far always
wanting, and leaving it to adjudicators has not produced good results either. With respect to Chinese
SOEs this risks continuing to be an issue, since the contractually agreed deadline (2016) after which
China should not be treated as NME anymore, risks proving to be full of holes and loopholes.

Keywords
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1. Property Regime and the WTO
Issues surrounding the operation of state owned enterprises in the international trading system is an
understudied area and yet one of increasing importance, particularly given the size and significance of
Chinese state owned enterprises (SOE). We start by situating the SOE within the GATT and WTO
frameworks and then summarize the main findings of a set papers prepared for an advanced law and
policy seminar on SOEs held at Columbia Law School in the fall 2016.
By way of introduction, it is important to remember that the GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade), the predecessor of the WTO (World Trade Organization), did not contain any provisions
to differentiate between approaches to property rights at the domestic level. The assumption was that
members of the GATT would be free markets (as opposed to centrally planned economies, or non
market economies – NMEs for short).
The GATT did not, however, close its doors to centrally planned economies. Indeed, Poland and
Romania joined the GATT and did not change the fundamental character of their centrally planned
systems. With the triumph of liberal ideas in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, a number of former NMEs
adopted free market policies and joined the WTO, which came into being on January 1, 1995.
Causality is hard to determine, however, i.e., whether countries first abandoned their NME status and
joined the WTO or whether joining the WTO contributed to their evolution away from planning.
Indeed, quite a variety of economic systems came to join the WTO, which did not oblige uniform
national approaches to trade or investment. Indeed, this lack of a harmonization requirement has often
been seen as a central strength of the GATT and WTO architecture. The WTO, contrary to the GATT,
adopted the practice of negotiating elaborate protocols of accession for NMEs, aimed at addressing
issues specific to the NME that was joining the WTO, until (the hope was) they would evolve into
market economies. This is by way of brief background for the following discussion of the
GATT/WTO architecture around SOEs.

2. GATT: Solving the Problem by Participation
The GATT was negotiated at a point in time when the only major NME of significance was the USSR
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Because the USSR declined the invitation to join the GATT, the
architecture of the GATT did not have to think long and hard about addressing NME-related issues.
2.1 Canada Suggests Only Like-Minded Should be Invited
A brief review of history reminds us that following a Canadian proposal to this effect,1 the instigators
of the GATT issued an invitation to participate in the upcoming negotiations only to like-minded
countries — and this essentially meant market economies. This approach was thought by some to be
too narrow an approach and going against the Hullian idea of pursuing liberalization of trade as an
instrument to foster peace and security.2 The eventual compromise, as reported at length in Irwin et al.
(2008), was to keep the door open. Accordingly, an invitation to join the GATT was consequently
issued to the USSR.

1
2

See the relevant discussion in Irwin et al. (2008).
Cordell Hull, the US Foreign Secretary during the Roosevelt Administration, and Nobel Prize laureate for his
contribution to post WWII peace, was adamant that trade liberalization was the safest way in establishing communication
across nations, and thus contribute meaningfully to peace. Irwin et al. (2008) provide a lot of evidence to this effect.
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2.1.1 Back to the USSR
By 1946, when the GATT was under negotiation, the USSR had already rejected the market opening
ideas of Lenin and its New Economic Policy (NEP). It had become a closed system that would engage
in international trade only with members of its alliance. Churchill described this situation in his
famous speech of March 5, 1946:
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the
continent.

Unsurprisingly thus, upon receipt of the invitation to join the GATT, the USSR declined it. The road
was thus open to negotiate the GATT across like-minded players, albeit with one, last minute point of
friction.
2.1.2 Czechoslovakia Switches Camps, Then Leaves
Czechoslovakia was a free market when the GATT negotiations were initiated. Following the Yalta
Agreement and the ensuing establishment of the ‘Iron Curtain’, the dividing line between market
economies and NMEs in Europe, it switched camps. Czechoslovakia did not immediately withdraw
from the negotiations. It eventually decided not to sign the GATT, which it then joined only decades
later in 1993 after its transition to market economy (in fact, its two components joined the WTO
namely, the Czech- and the Slovak Republic through separate acts of accession).
2.2 Statutory Provisions Regarding NMEs
The United Kingdom (UK) was a key participant in the early negotiations. Although the leading
economist of his generation, John Maynard Keynes, did not participate in the GATT negotiation
because of his untimely death, he had ample time during the Bretton Woods negotiations to express
his views on the role of government when conducting international trade. According to Irwin et al.
(2008) on p. 18:
Keynes strongly believed that government economic planning would be required to ensure full
employment in the postwar period. Such planning, in his view, would necessarily include
3
government controls on international trade. The State Department and other U.S. agencies took a
very different view. Not only did they want nondiscrimination as a key part of the world trading
system, but they also wanted to ensure that most international trade would be left in the hands of
private enterprise, not government planners.

Chief among the provisions regarding the role of the state in trade relations, was Article XVII of
GATT regarding the function of state-trading enterprises (STEs). Its key features provide:
… a State enterprise … shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a
manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment …require that such
enterprises … make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial
considerations,* … and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate
opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such
purchases or sales (emphasis added)

3

An economic official at the U.S. Embassy in London, E. F. Penrose (1953, 18), recalled about this period: “At that time
and later I did my best to impress on Mr. Keynes and other government economists that the desire for freer and for nondiscriminatory trade in the State Department should not be written off as the product of a nineteenth century laissez-faire
attitude toward economic affairs, untouched by recent economic thought and experience. . . . In conversations in
Washington both Acheson and Hawkins showed themselves progressive in outlook and under no illusion that freer trade
alone was panacea for all economic ills. However, it soon appeared that the contrary view had been expressed to British
officials in Washington by some U.S. officials outside the State Department.” Markwell (2006) provides a good study of
Keynes’s views on international economic matters.
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Eventually, another provision was added in the form of an Interpretative Note to Article VI of
GATT.
2.2.1 Article XVII of GATT
The UK and Canada were the leaders of the discussion of this provision, which aimed to discipline
trading nations that conducted trade through state entities. Wheat Boards, for example, were very
much in vogue around that time aiming to stabilize fluctuating prices of farm goods. The provision
imposed a nondiscrimination obligation on STEs, and, in the second paragraph, an obligation for them
to act in accordance with commercial considerations, and to afford adequate opportunities to
competitors.
Case law has substantially weakened the ‘bite’ of this provision, by finding that it suffices for STEs
to act in a nondiscriminatory manner. In this view, by acting in this manner, STEs had ipso facto acted
in accordance with commercial considerations, and had afforded competitors adequate opportunities to
compete as well. This view is, of course, at best doubtful, but by now it is water under the bridge,
since there is not one single deviation from this case law.4
2.2.2 Article VI of GATT
The Interpretative Note to Article VI of GATT5 provides for the possibility to deviate from standard
antidumping procedures when dealing with exporters originating in NMEs. The interesting feature of
this provision is that it provides for a definition of NMEs:
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State …

This is a very demanding provision. By this standard, one might in principle wonder if there is even
one nation on earth at the present time that qualifies as an NME. And yet, in application, the practice
has proven flexible. This provision has been used against Eastern European countries, as well as China
and some of its neighbors.
2.2.3 End Result: Much Ado about Nothing (but Something is Around the Corner)
Given this history, it follows that the GATT regime did not address the issue of state trading or the
operation of firms in non-market economies in a comprehensive manner. It was not much of an issue,
in any event, in the early days given the small membership of the GATT. Over time, however, as
many more countries joined into the system, the systemic consequences of limited provisions on
NMEs have become more significant and apparent.
2.3 Subsequent Accessions
Prior to the negotiation of the Uruguay Round, only two NMEs joined the GATT, namely, Poland
(1967) and Romania (1971). They signed protocols of accession where they accepted a few additional
obligations, but nothing very comprehensive or dramatic. They continued as NMEs until the fall of the
Berlin Wall, and the beginning of their negotiation to accede to the European Union (Williams 2008).

4

5

Mavroidis (2016) discusses the case law to this effect. The leading case is Canada-Wheat Exports and Grain Imports,
issued in 2004, where the Appellate Body understood the obligation to not discriminate as the overarching obligation, and
the obligations to “act in accordance with commercial consideration”, and to “afford adequate opportunities to compete”
as mere expressions of the obligations to not discriminate, and not as distinct legal obligations.
Jackson (1969) discusses this provision, its birth and original idea in detail.

European University Institute
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For much of its early history the GATT was overwhelmingly comprised of western nations and there
was no perceived need to develop comprehensive provisions to address what seemed to be a nonissue.

3. Solving the Problem by Contracting
This changed with the WTO. One hundred and twenty three nations signed onto the WTO initially,
and many of them were not full market economies. Given the limited coverage of relevant provisions
under the rules of the GATT, trading nations chose to add additional disciplines through the
contracting process of the negotiation of protocols of accession. Disciplines were agreed both at the
multilateral as well as the preferential level.
3.1 Multilateral Solutions (WTO)
The WTO, as per its custom to minimize negotiating costs, did not address the issue of SOEs in a
horizontal manner. It did not amend existing provisions. It preferred to address selected issues on an
ad hoc basis by allowing incumbents to negotiate deals with acceding nations. The means to do this
were offered by the new, lengthy Protocols of Accession.
NME-status, if we take the statutory definition seriously, does not only arise in the case of the
China. Many WTO members meet the definitional standard. Nevertheless, only the Chinese Protocol
of Accession includes elaborate provisions on NMEs. Indeed, the Russian Protocol of Accession pales
in comparison, as do the protocols of some Gulf countries with elaborate sovereign wealth funds and
other state run entities.
Why is China the issue? As evident in discussion after discussion in our seminar, the answer can be
found in two words: “size matters”. China accepted to be treated until 2016 an NME, and avoided thus
the negotiation of disciplines that would oblige it to precommit to a particular market structure by a
date certain. Title 15 of its Protocol of Accession (Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and
Dumping) reads:
Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a
market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the
importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In
any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession.
In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member,
that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market economy
provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or sector.

It is not entirely clear why 2016 was selected as the date when China would no longer be treated as an
NME. Some of the papers presented in our seminar (Levy) have advanced the argument that,
presumably, WTO members might have thought that between 2001, the year of Chinese accession to
the WTO, and 2016, the reforms that were then underway would have translated into a fully
functioning market economy, whatever ultimate beneficial ownership may still exist.
More generally, as some of the essays herein amplify, China agreed in its Protocol to far reaching
provisions around its domestic trade and economic system. For example, in article 9 of its Protocol it
committed to “allow prices for traded goods and services in every sector to be determined by market
forces”; in Article 5.1 it committed to “progressively liberalize the availability and scope of the right
to trade, so that within three years after accession all enterprises in China shall have the right to trade
in goods”; it further committed in article 6.1 that “import purchasing procedures of state trading
enterprises are fully transparent”. As evidenced by these and other provisions, China’s Protocol was
perhaps the most ambitious and far reaching set of commitments of any developing country that has
joined the international trading system.
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3.2 Preferential Trade Agreements
There is not much practice regarding the treatment of NMEs in the context of preferential trade
agreements. A recent and fairly comprehensive approach is offered by the definition of SOEs in TPP
(Trans-Pacific Partnership). TPP was negotiated by the countries around the Pacific Rim, but China
was not part of the negotiation and, as a result, it could not influence its structure and outcome. Bhala
(2017) discusses in detail the TPP definition of NMEs in this volume. As he explains, the TPP
definition of NMEs clearly departs from the WTO case law understanding regarding the nature of
obligations imposed on the state sector.
3.3 The Road Ahead
We are now in early 2017, and China has already initiated litigation to have WTO judges decide
whether the 2016 deadline has to be honored. Is 2016 the end of the road for China as an NME?
It is always difficult to predict how the Appellate Body might decide on a question before it but in
EC-Fasteners the Appellate Body appears to have opened the door to treat China as an NME even
after 2016. Bown and Mavroidis (2013) suggested that the onus will be on complainants who will
have to demonstrate that states influence prices. Their argument, briefly, is that by including 2016 as
some sort of ‘expiration date’ for treating China as an NME, WTO members did not give up on their
right to do so after 2016 as well. This date should be understood differently. WTO members can treat
China as an NME until 2016 without adducing any evidence to this effect, that is, by merely invoking
the statutory provision in the Protocol of Accession. After 2016, they can continue to do the same, but
in this case, they will have to honor the associated burden of proof, that is, they will have to show that
the Chinese state has influenced prices, and the latter are not the reflection of a market clearing
mechanism.
This is not a far-fetched theory as it simply cannot be that the NME provision applies in principle
to everyone but not to China. In theory any jurisdiction could be treated in this way, such as the US
following the introduction of TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program), or the EU when heavily
subsidizing some of its sectors. If so, why not China?
By this reading, 2016 would mean that China will not automatically be treated as an NME. Those
who want to apply the rules around NMEs would have to make the case for it. But this particular set of
issues has to do with the standards that will apply with respect to contingent protection, which is
reviewed on a case by case basis. WTO’s main contribution is to address conditions that affect
international trade more broadly; it is not designed to address rivalry within markets. Other
instruments (such as antitrust or competition laws) are meant to address similar concerns within
markets.
How are SOEs affecting access to foreign imports? Is this covered by the rules of the WTO? Has
China established a fully transparent trade regime? Needless to say, these are some of the complex and
new questions being raised by Chinese commercial entities.

4. Contributions on China and SOEs prepared for the law and policy seminar
Papers addressed three broad themes: first, the substantive economic and trade regime; second, the
intersection between trade and competition policy, and third, transparency of and dispute adjudication
relating to SOEs.
4.1 The Substantive Trade Regime
Lin (2017) explains the manner in which SOEs operate and their oversight by different state entities,
providing an excellent background for understanding the main challenges to the world trading system
European University Institute
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presented by SOEs. Lin provides a comprehensive anatomy of Chinese SOEs by unpacking their
various relations with different instruments of the state. She shows that Chinese SOEs are embedded
in a network composed of dense and complex links with the state. Shareholding ties, albeit important,
are only one feature of potential state influence or control. She illustrates important governance
institutions that are unobservable (e.g., they have no statutory underpinnings), and are quite distinct
from approaches elsewhere in the world. In doing that, she explains the role of state intervention in
administering SOEs, particularly through the SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administrative Commission of the State Council), a state entity responsible for administration of
SOEs.
Mastromatteo (2017) discusses Article XVII of GATT. He notes that, by acting as a trader, a
government may influence the direction of international trade through its purchases and sales
decisions without resort to other more direct means of trade regulation. The GATT recognizes that
governments may choose to participate in international commerce in competition with private firms,
but it does not leave them with a free hand when it comes to carrying out trading operations. In the 70
years since their adoption, developments in both the GATT 1947 and the WTO have delineated a set
of relatively limited disciplines rooted in the principle of nondiscrimination, raising doubts about their
effectiveness to address the kinds of problems caused by state trading today. It remains true, however,
that while STEs continue to operate across the world, and fundamental questions about the full reach
and scope of the existing disciplines endure, opportunities to clarify their role in the modern trading
system may well arise in the future practice of WTO members.
Prusa (2017) focuses on the other core GATT provision, the Interpretative Note as Article VI, and
the manner in which NMEs have fared in WTO antidumping practice. In his paper, he aims to show
that, whereas the statutes allow investigating authorities more leeway when dealing with NMEs,
abuses have been condemned in case law. To do this, he focuses in a very important litigation that
occurred in 2007, when the US reversed its long-standing policy prohibiting the simultaneous
imposition of anti-dumping duties (ADDs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) against nonmarket
economies. The EU followed the US’ lead and also began imposing simultaneous ADDs and CVDs.
The practice, however, leads to double remedies. The WTO Appellate Body recently ruled that double
remedies were inconsistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and
that the burden was on the investigating authorities to ensure that double remedies were not being
imposed.
In a companion paper, Lee (2017) focuses on the issue whether Chinese SOEs should be
considered to be a ‘public body’ in the sense of the SCM Agreement. A positive response would entail
that the SCM disciplines apply to SOEs. This is an issue that has occupied the minds of WTO judges
for some time now, and case law is not characterized by internal coherence either. Lee explains the
various transformations of case law in this respect, as well as its current status. In his view, a
sophisticated ‘control’-criterion seems appropriate, and he advances a few thoughts regarding the
manner in which it should be practiced.
Levy (2017) discusses the manner in which SOEs have been handled in Protocols of Accession.
His main conclusion is that they have not been handled particularly well. He notes that the treatment in
the text of the Chinese Protocol was very brief, and essentially offered particular China-specific
adjustments to existing WTO agreements, such as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM). Those agreements had often been inadequate to handle the issues faced by a preChina WTO and the tweaks were insufficient to handle the additional problems posed by China. In
many cases, foreseeable problems were simply not addressed at all in the Protocol. Unsurprisingly,
thus, we end up in the current state, where no jurisdiction seems to be happy with the regulation of
SOEs.
Bhala (2017) focuses on how regional initiatives, and specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), have tried to avoid the shortcomings of the multilateral (inadequate) regulation of SOEs. Free
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trade agreements (FTAs) are about far more than free trade, he notes. They are often about national
security as well. Against this background, he makes two points. First, TPP exemplifies the possibility
of enhancing US national security objectives. Advancement of such objectives may occur through the
containment of China and its ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Second, the debate over the
definition of SOE is one among many illustrations in TPP of the link between national security, trade,
and containment. The 12 nations negotiating TPP were aware of this link, and deliberated on the
definition of SOE. TPP parties did not include China amongst its founding members, even as the
founding members wrote TPP rules that would bind China if it subsequently joined the deal. Chinese
SOEs were of concern to the negotiating parties to the TPP for both economic and national security
reasons. In addition, a number of TPP parties had their own sovereign interests in providing goods and
services through their own SOEs. The evaluation by America and its 11 TPP partners as to which
entities should be included in the scope of SOE disciplines, produced, for the first time, a set of clear
rules.
4.2 Trade and Competition Issues
A second cluster of papers considered the competition issues associated with SOEs. Wu (2017)
discusses why, despite the fact that China’s WTO Protocol of Accession imposes several restrictions
on China’s use of export policies to support domestic industries, China’s trading partners nevertheless
regularly bemoan Chinese practices. In his contribution, Wu examines a series of Chinese export
policies that have been the subject of WTO complaints. He discusses several elements of WTO law
that render the WTO largely ineffective in confronting these practices. He argues that, because of
domestic constraints and negotiating stasis, it is unlikely that the WTO system will undertake any
major reforms to address these shortcomings. He concludes that as a consequence, tensions are likely
to continue rising between China and its trading partners.
Kovacic (2017) focuses on the extent of rivalry within the Chinese market, and the significant and
broad policy developments emerging from the 3rd Plenum, namely the decisions to establish a
competitive economy, and at the 4th Plenum to advance the rule of law. These reforms are necessary to
achieving China’s strategic economic objectives, and to its successful and rapid transition to become a
high income economy. If adopted, the author argues, the two main outcomes of the reforms would be,
first, a reduction in the size and scope of the uncompetitive regulated sub-economy and a
corresponding, inverse increase in the size and scope of the competitive sub-economy; and second, a
strengthened competition law and policy regime that can be more effectively enforced throughout the
national economy without discrimination by ownership or industry. Both these outcomes would help
China to exploit more fully the country’s latent economic potential, and to achieve high, robust and
sustainable growth rates based on efficiency, innovation and international competitiveness. They
would also ensure China’s ‘Market Economy Status’ in global economic relations.
4.3 Transparency and Adjudication
A third set of papers explore the question whether the solution to the challenges posed by SOEs is
better served through increased transparency, or conversely, whether reform can be best achieved
through adjudication.
Wolfe (2017) notes that SOEs are a major force in the Chinese economy and a growing presence in
international trade and investment. Thus, the challenge to the WTO legal regime is both commercial,
given their size and their share of Chinese output, and political, given worries that trade and
investment by SOEs may be driven by public policy goals. And both challenges may be exacerbated
by the murky world of Chinese SOEs. He first addresses the question whether Chinese SOEs are a
problem for the WTO, and whether more sunshine on their operations might be a useful discipline. He
then asks what we know about SOEs inside the WTO, including in the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. Since the answer is, in his view, that these mechanisms offer little guidance or insight, he
European University Institute
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consider whether mega-regional trade negotiations offer a better approach. His answer being negative,
he finally considers whether an attempt to negotiate a WTO Reference Paper on SOEs might help. He
concludes that transparency is likely to be a better discipline on the spillovers associated with SOEs
than a search for binding rules, while also helping everyone better understand the efficiency effects.
Trachtman (2017) addresses the broad category of industrial policy conflicts between China and
the United States, with subsections focusing on discrete issues such as discrimination, subsidies,
dumping, export restrictions, exchange rate management, and state owned enterprises. He further
addresses conflicts that have arisen because of concerns relating to security policy, and then examines
how U.S. and Chinese preferential trade agreement initiatives have sought to gain advantage in these
areas—a kind of strategic forum shopping—recognizing that the new U.S. administration is unlikely
to move forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He argues that international law can be used in
two ways: to promote short-term national advantage in particular disputes, and/or to support rules that
benefit all, with the expectation that over the long term, this will best promote national advantage.
China and the U.S., the author claims, can lead the world in formulating and using WTO law. If they
both engage in long-term support of beneficial trade rules, they will both prosper more in the long run.
In conclusion, the set of essays comprise a multi-faceted examination of SOEs in the international
trading system. It is a subject of importance to the further integration of China into the world trading
system but has broader implications for all jurisdictions where state enterprises continue to be a
significant area of economic activity.
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